Monthly Archives: March 2014

Right to Work (For Less): The Impact of ‘Right to Work’ Laws on Workers, Their Families, and the Economy as a Whole

Right to Work (For Less):

The Impact of ‘Right to Work’ Laws on Workers, Their Families, and the Economy as a Whole

By Nathan Gilbert

“Those who would destroy or further limit the right of organized labor- those who would cripple collective bargaining or prevent organization of the unorganized- do a disservice to the cause of democracy”[1] –John F. Kennedy

  1. Introduction

Over the past few years, those who seek to restrict and roll-back workers’ rights have been hard at work.  From Gov. Scott Walker’s push in Wisconsin to restrict collective bargaining rights,[2] to politicians interfering with a union election in Tennessee[3], the war on workers and their hard-fought gains in the workplace is being waged nationwide.  One of the major fronts in this struggle is the promulgation of so-called ‘Right to Work” laws.[4] This essay will examine Right to Work laws and the adverse impact they ultimately have on those who they claim to protect.

  1. Right to Work Explained

To adequately address this issue, we must first define what a Right to Work law is.  In short, Right to Work laws allow those represented by unions and covered by collective bargaining agreements negotiated and administered by unions to opt out of paying for such representation.[5] In a non-Right to Work state, or union security state, if an individual works in a location that is represented by a union, the employee has a choice: he can either choose to join the union and pay union dues, or he can choose not to join the union and pay a fair share fee to compensate the union for the costs of representing him.[6]

Critics call this “forced unionism”[7], but this moniker is simply not true.  Since the passage of the Taft Hartley Act of 1947, no person can be forced to join a union as a condition of employment.[8]  So, even in a state without Right to Work, no one can be forced to join a union against their will.  What is true, however, is that in union security states, employees who choose not to join the union can be required to pay a fee to the union to reimburse it for the costs of representing the worker.[9] The NLRB mandates that this fee cover “only that share of dues used directly for representation, such as collective bargaining and contract administration.”[10]  This is because, if the employee works in a union environment, the union is bound to represent and negotiate on behalf of all workers in the bargaining unit whether  they choose to join the union or not.[11]

The difference in a Right to Work state is that an employee cannot be required to pay union dues, nor pay such a fee to the union for the costs of representation, nor can he be required to join the union that represents him.[12] Essentially, the worker can get a “free ride”, by not paying union dues nor a fair share fee while still retaining all of the wages, benefits, and representational rights that the union has bargained for.  Again, the worker still enjoys all of the benefits and protections of the union contract even though he is not reimbursing the union at all for the services rendered.[13]

To help explain this concept, it may be beneficial to use an example. Let’s consider John the welder.  John chooses to go to work for ABC Corp. in Colorado, a union security state.  ABC’s employees are represented by Union XYZ.  When John chooses to go to work for ABC, he will be covered by the union contract negotiated and administered by XYZ.  This means he will receive all of the protections that come from union representation.  Since John is working in a union security state, he will be required to either join the union or pay a fair share fee to the union for their services in representing him.[14]  Now, let’s change the scenario and place John in a Right to Work state, say Mississippi.  John still works for ABC and is still represented by Union XYZ.  The difference now is that, because of the Right to Work law, John is not required to pay anything for the representation and benefits he receives under the union contract.[15]  He is basically allowed to receive all of the union benefits and representation without footing any of the bill.  This shifts the costs of John’s representation to his fellow co-workers who do choose to join the union.  Essentially, John’s co-workers are paying for his ‘right’ to free load.  It naturally follows that if all workers can get union benefits and protections without paying for them, then it is likely that very few employees will ever join the union and eventually the union will not be financially able to continue representing the employees.

This would be akin to a shopper going into a warehouse store such as Sam’s Club and demanding the same lower prices enjoyed by members without having to pay for those benefits through membership fees.  I can imagine that Sam’s Club would not support such a “right-to-shop” scheme, but this is no different than Right to Work.  It seems that union security states operate on the simple principle that if one enjoys the benefits on another’s hard work, he/she should have to contribute something to compensate for those efforts.  In a union security state, if a worker does not want to join the union or pay his fair share, he is still free to find work in an environment without union representation.  Unions are not charities and cannot survive without dues-paying members. Thus, it is natural that Right to Work laws would lead to the decreasing power of unions and a parallel decline in the standard of living for workers. This is exactly what Right to Work does.

  1. Consequences of Right to Work

One of the main consequences of attacking workers and their unions through Right to Work laws is the lower wages and benefits enjoyed by such workers when compared to those represented by unions:

  • “On average workers in states with “Right to Work” earn $5,538 a year less than workers in states without these laws.”[16]
  • “Overall union members earn 28 percent ($198) more per week than nonunion workers.”[17]
  •  “78 percent of private sector union workers have access to medical insurance through their jobs, compared with 51 percent of nonunion workers.”[18]
  • “Only 2.9 percent of union workers are uninsured, compared with14.2 percent of nonunion workers.”[19]
  • “…77 percent of private sector union workers have access to a guaranteed (defined benefit) retirement plan through their jobs, compared with just 20 percent of nonunion workers”[20]
  • Perhaps most startlingly, “[a]ccording to data from the Bureau of Labor Statistics, the rate of workplace deaths is 52.9% higher in states with Right-to-Work laws.”[21]

One of the main reasons that many on the Right often cite in of support Right to Work laws is that they believe that these laws will create jobs and support industrial development in their states.[22]  This also, does not seem to be the case.  A study from the Economic Policy Institute examined the state of Oklahoma before and after it passed Right to Work legislation.[23]  The study concluded that “Right-to-work laws have not succeeded in boosting employment growth in the states that have adopted them.”[24] Additionally, when looking at Oklahoma, one of the most recent states to pass Right to Work, the study found that before the law, manufacturing jobs were on the increase, but after Right to Work, “manufacturing employment and relocations into the state reversed their climb and began to fall, precisely the opposite of what right-to-work advocates promised.”[25]  Thus, the job growth panacea promised by proponents of Right to Work does not seem to conflate with reality.

But, for argument’s sake, let’s assume for a moment that Right to Work laws did increase job growth in states that adopt it. Would that be a good thing?  The businesses that would be moving to Right to Work states would likely move there to escape the wages and benefits bargained for by unions in their former states.  This means that these companies are likely relocating to Right to Work states to take advantage of lower wages, fewer benefits, and less workers’ rights and safety regulations. Is this the kind of economy that we want to encourage?  Right to Work contributes to a race to the bottom where the state that offers the lowest wages and fewest benefits “wins” new business.  But it is surely not the workers nor their families who “win”[26], nor is it even the states who attract these news jobs.[27]  It seems that the only winners of the race to the bottom are big business and the campaign accounts of their political allies.  This is evidenced by the millions of dollars big businesses and their affiliated lobbying organizations spend supporting Right to Work and other anti-worker legislation.[28]

  1. Conclusion

In conclusion, Right to Work is just another battle in the current War on Workers and their families.  Right to Work allows employees to enjoy all the benefits of union representation while paying none of the costs.[29]  In addition, Right to Work contributes to lower wages[30] and fewer benefits,[31] all the while failing to deliver on its promise of economic growth.[32]  Right to Work may be right for big business and politicians who seek to rescind workers’ rights and attack the unions that fought for and continue to defend them, but it is wrong for America.

[1] John F. Kennedy, Special Labor Day Message from Democratic Presidential Candidate John F. Kennedy, Am. Presidency Project (Sep. 5, 1960), available at

[2] Ian Saleh, Wisconsin Gov. Scott Walker Signs Collective Bargaining Bill, Bypasses Senate Democrats, The Washington Post(Mar. 11, 2011), available at

[3] Historic Election Brings Outside Interference In the Vote of Chattanooga Volkswagen Workers, United Auto Workers (Feb. 14, 2014), available at

[4] Gordon Evans, Mother Jones: Right to Work Could Spread Beyond Michigan, WMUK 102.1 FM (Feb. 2, 2014), available at

[5] Employer/Union Rights and Obligations, Nat’l Lab. Rel. Board, available at (Last visited Mar. 27, 2014).

[6] See id. (“The NLRA allows employers and unions to enter into union security agreements which require all employees in a bargaining unit to… pay[] union dues and fees…  Even under a security agreement, employees who object to full union membership may… pay only that share of dues used directly for representation…”)

[7] Right to Work States, Nat’l Right to Work Legal Def. Found., available at (Last visited Mar. 27, 2014.)

[8] 1947 Taft-Hartley Substantive Provisions, Nat’l Lab. Rel. Board, available at (Last visited Mar 27, 2014).

[9]  See Nat’l Lab. Rel. Board, supra note 5.

[10] Id.

[11] Id.

[12] Id.

[13] See id.

[14] See id.

[15] See id.

[16] Jennifer Schaubach, “Right to Work” Laws: Get the Facts, Minnesota AFL-CIO, available at (Last visited Mar. 27, 2014).

[17] Id.

[18] Id.

[19] Id.

[20] Id.

[21] Id.

[22] James Sherk, Right to Work Increases Jobs and Choices, The Heritage Foundation (Nov. 9, 2011), available at

[23] Sylvia A. Allegretto & Gordon Lafer, Does ‘Right-to-Work’ Create Jobs? Answers from Oklahoma, Econ. Pol’y Inst. (Feb. 28, 2011), available at

[24] Id.

[25] Id.

[26] See Schaubach, supra note 16.

[27] See Allegretto & Lafer, supra note 23.

[28] See Lee Fang, Pro-‘Right to Work’ Groups In Michigan Outspend Union Counterparts, The Nation (Dec. 8, 2012), available at (For example, in a recent Right to Work fight in Michigan, big business funded groups spent millions of dollars and vastly outspent their labor opponents in succeeding to get Right to Work legislation passed there)

[29] See Nat’l Lab. Rel. Board, supra note 5.

[30] See Schaubach, supra note 16.

[31] See id.

[32] See Allegretto & Lafer, supra note 23.

“Deliberate Indifference” to Prison Sex Abuse Sets Stage for 8th Amendment Challenge

“Deliberate indifference” to prison sex abuse sets stage for 8th Amendment challenge

by Tiffany Ray

If it’s true that the measure of civilization in a society can be judged by entering its prisons,[1] then Alabama is a barbaric place. The proliferation of sexual misconduct, coercion, vulgarity and mistreatment that constitutes life at the Julia Tutwiler Prison for Women in Wetumpka, Ala., is by now well known: A 36-page report by the U.S. Department of Justice, released early this year and widely reported in the press, documents a 20-year history of “unabated staff-on-prisoner sexual abuse and harassment” that has left the women incarcerated there to “universally fear for their safety.”[2]

In its report, which is the result of an extensive investigation, the DOJ asserts that, for nearly two decades, guards at Tutwiler have raped and sodomized inmates and coerced them into performing oral sex.[3] They have forced them to submit to sexual abuse in order to receive basic necessities such as tampons or laundry service.[4] They have watched the women as they take off their clothes, shower, and use the toilet, and they have subjected them to sexually explicit verbal abuse.[5] Allegations of such abuse are investigated superficially, if at all, and women who have reported such allegations have been subjected to further abuse by guards, to segregation, or to lie detector tests.[6]

The DOJ asserts that the state has violated (and presumably continues to violate) the Eighth Amendment rights of Tutwiler prisoners by “failing to protect [them] from harm due to sexual abuse and harassment from correctional staff.”[7] The Eighth Amendment provides board protection to prisoners from “cruel and unusual punishment” by government, but what are the contours of that right?

The Supreme Court has found that the test for what constitutes a cruel and unusual condition is not static, but rather drawn “from the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society.”[8] Surely what is happening at Tutwiler Prison is indecent by any standard. According to the Court, the conditions “must not involve the wanton and unnecessary infliction of pain, nor . . . be grossly disproportionate to the severity of the crime warranting imprisonment.”[9] The Constitution “’does not mandate comfortable prisons,’ (citation omitted), but neither does it permit inhumane ones.”[10] Conditions may be “restrictive” or even “harsh” and still be Constitutional.[11]  However, “a prison official’s ‘deliberate indifference’ to a substantial risk of serious harm to an inmate violates the Eighth Amendment.”[12]

In Farmer v. Brennan, one of three cases cited by the DOJ to support its assertion of a constitutional violation, the Supreme Court determined that deliberate indifference is shown when an official was “subjectively aware of the risk.”[13] In that case, a transsexual prisoner who was biologically male and projected feminine characteristics was raped and beaten after being placed in the general male population of a high-security prison.[14] Vacating and remanding a lower-court ruling for defendants in the case, the Court found that a prison official could be held liable for denying a prisoner humane confinement conditions if the official “knows that inmates face a substantial risk of serious harm and disregard that risk by failing to take reasonable measures to abate it.”[15]

The Court determined that deliberate indifference of prison officials equated to the subjective recklessness requirement of criminal law; something more than negligence but less than “acts or omissions for the very purpose of causing harm or with knowledge that harm will result.”[16] The Court said prison officials need not be aware of a specific risk from a specific source: “. . . [I]t does not matter whether the risk comes from a single source or multiple sources, any more than it matters whether a prisoner faces an excessive risk of attack for reasons personal to him or because all prisoners in his situation face such a risk.”[17]

In Farmer, the Court said the Eighth Amendment both constrains the actions of prison officials – preventing them, for example, from using excessive force against a prisoner – and also imposes duties on them to provide “humane conditions of confinement.”[18] Specifically, officials must “ensure that inmates receive adequate food, clothing, shelter, and medical care, and must take ‘reasonable measures to guarantee the safety of the inmates.’”[19] In Helling v. McKinney, the Court found that deliberate indifference to conditions that pose a serious risk to future health violates Eighth Amendment standards, even when no harm has yet occurred.[20] Prisoners have found relief from the courts from exposed electrical wiring, exposure to contagious diseases from other inmates, and, in Helling, from constant exposure to secondhand smoke.[21]

From such a footing, it does not seem far to go to determine that inmates deserve relief from the “universal fear” of sexual abuse and retaliation by their jailers. No one should live day to day with the fear that they might be the next target for abuse, and particularly in a place that is designed to provide them no means of escape. Just the threat of such abuse is corrosive and debilitating, particularly for the women at Tutwiler who, the DOJ says, are already more vulnerable because they are more likely to have been a victim of abuse prior to incarceration.[22] Surely the state has a duty to protect inmates from such treatment.

Moreover, it appears from the DOJ report that state officials have had notice of sex-abuse problems at Tutwiler since at least 1995, when the agency reported it as part of an investigation into the prison’s treatment of mental health issues.[23] More recent evidence was available as well: A 2007 DOJ report of sexual assault in prisons found that Tutwiler was among the worst offenders, ranking 11th out of 146 prison facilities for reports of sexual assault.[24] A report by the Montgomery-based Equal Justice Initiative in 2012 found that conditions had not improved since 2007 and that “pervasive sexual misconduct” continued.[25] It seems clear that the state knew women at Tutwiler were being sexually abused and yet failed to act to prevent it.

News of poor prison conditions in Alabama is hardly a shock, but the level of depravity and disregard apparently at work at Tutwiler is particularly galling. State officials have attempted to defend the indefensible; Kim Thomas, Commissioner of the Alabama Department of Corrections, for example, has said the DOJ’s findings were “off-base,” and prison conditions were not unconstitutional, though he declined to talk in specifics.[26]  Thomas said the department had requested an independent examination by the National Institute of Corrections, part of the DOJ, in 2012 following the Equal Justice Initiative reports of sexual abuse at Tutwiler and has been working to implement changes since then.[27] Among the improvements cited by officials are efforts to recruit more female prison staff at Tutwiler and train prison staff on proper management of female inmates, and plans to install security cameras.[28]

The fact that such improvements are not already an integral part of Tutwiler management would suggest a level of long-term apathy that casts doubt on the ability of state officials to take meaningful action now. Clearly, the state has been on notice for a long time that rights violations were occurring – or at the very least, were likely occurring – at Tutwiler. And yet the “proactive” steps cited by officials to curb such abuses began only a couple of years ago, and have apparently gotten nowhere. Meanwhile, Alabama prisons have been perennially underfunded, and there is no political gain for legislators in advocating an appropriation of additional resources for the benefit of convicted criminals. Thus, there is little hope of any drastic commitment by the Legislature to push through needed reforms.

Fortunately for the inmates of Julia Tutwiler Prison, the DOJ investigation appears far from over. The pervasiveness of sex-abuse allegations has led the DOJ to expand its examination to other, related areas: excessive use of force, constitutionally inadequate conditions of confinement, constitutionally inadequate medical and mental health care, and discriminatory treatment based on national origin, sexual orientation, and gender identity.[29] The DOJ report also included a litany of reforms the agency says must be implemented to curb sexual misconduct by prison staff, as well as the threat of a legal action brought by the Attorney General if they are not.[30]

[1] This statement is often attributed to Fyodor Dostoyevsky. See, e.g., Fyodor Dostoyevsky quotes,, available at

[2] Letter from Jocelyn Samuels, Acting Assistant Attorney General, U.S. Department of Justice, Civil Rights Division, to Hon. Robert Bentley, Governor of Alabama (Jan. 17, 2014),

[3] Id.

[4] Id.

[5] Id.

[6] Id.

[7] Id.

[8] Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 346 (1981).

[9]  Id. at 347.

[10] Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994).

[11] Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 347.

[12] Farmer, 511 U.S. at 829.

[13] Id. at 828-29.

[14] Id. at 829-30.

[15] Id. at 848.

[16] Id. at 835.

[17] Id. at 843 (quoting Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25 (1993)).

[18] Id. at 832.

[19] Id.

[20] 509 U.S. 25, 33 (1993).

[21] Id. at 34.

[22] See Letter from Jocelyn Samuels to Hon. Robert Bentley, supra note 2.

[23] Id.

[24] Id.

[25] Id.

[26] Mike Cason, Department of Justice finds conditions at Julia Tutwiler Prison to be unconstitutional,, Jan. 17, 2014,

[27] Id.

[28] Id.

[29] See Letter from Jocelyn Samuels to Hon. Robert Bentley, supra note 2.

[30] Id.

Free Speech or Treason: Finding the Correct Standard for Material Support

Free Speech or Treason: Finding the Correct Standard for Material Support

Abigail Castleberry

            On February 13, 2004, Dr. Tarek Mehanna returned to his home in Boston after a ten-day trip to Abu Dhabi and Yemen. Prosecutors pointed to this trip in arguing that Mehanna provided himself as personnel to Al-Qaeda, though no proof of actual contact was presented to the jury. Later in 2005. Mehanna, at the request of an acquaintance, provided English translations of Arabic-language materials for a website. Mehanna also disseminated certain Arabic texts raising points of Islamic doctrine and opposition to the United States’ actions in Iraq. No evidence was presented at trial showing that any of this material was solicited by Al-Qaeda, and most of the evidence pointed to Mehanna’s actions being an expression of his own personal views. Mehanna was arrested in November of 2008, right before departing to Saudi Arabia for a clinical pharmacy position. After Mehanna refused to serve as an informant, the government filed terrorism charges. Mehanna was convicted of providing “material support” to a terrorist organization, the charge most often used in federal terrorism cases. [1] The statute forbids four types of material support: training, expert advice or assistance, service, and personnel. [2] Prosecutors argued that Mehanna’s translations and postings provided a service to Al-Qaeda. Mehanna was convicted and sentenced to seventeen years, and he appealed to the First Circuit  Court of Appeals which affirmed the conviction. [3] Mehanna has applied for certiorari from the United States Supreme Court.

The foundation of the case is the meaning of Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project.[4] In Humanitarian Law Project, the Court held that the material support statute could constitutionally prohibit “coordinated” speech such as the direct, interactive teaching. [5] Furthermore, the court defined “service” to “cover advocacy performed in coordination with, or at least at the direction of, a foreign terrorist organization.” [6] However, the Court made it clear that individual advocacy could not be covered by the statute.[7] Humanitarian Law Project did leave open the exact definition of “coordination,” noting that the “’gradation of fact or charge would made a difference as to criminal liability,’ and so adjudication of the reach and constitutionality of the statute must await a concrete situation.”[8] Mehanna claims his case is the ideal for testing the contours of the “material support” statute.

The essential question in this case is how broadly or narrowly the Court will define “coordination.” According to the government’s argument, speech is unprotected when the purpose is in support of the enemy. Therefore, moral support is essentially “coordination” according the government. Such a broad definition likely violates Mehanna’s First Amendment rights. However, there are multiple standards in defining “coordination,” and depending upon the standard that is applied, the outcome of Mehanna’s case could potentially have drastic variations. The standard asserted by the government is likely too broad and difficult to apply. Determining whether speech is in support of the enemy would be an extensively subjective analysis. Under this standard, even a mild condoning of the enemy’s action could be construed as aiding the enemy. Therefore, under this standard, Mehanna’s conviction would likely stand. Though Mehanna had no direct connections with Al Qaeda, his translations likely were read by members and potential trainees. Therefore, the postings and translations would meet the government’s standard for coordination.

The best standard, and the one that likely adheres to the wording of the material support statute, would require actual contact and dealing with the enemy. This standard is supported by the Humanitarian Law Project in which the Court stated that individual advocacy could not be construed as falling under the material support statute. Unlike the government’s standard, requiring contact and dealing with terrorist groups is beneficial on two fronts. First, the standard respects the First Amendment. Those who voice an opinion in support of a terrorist group’s actions will be protected. However, the standard also follows treason jurisprudence by supporting the proposition “trafficking with the enemy, in whatever form, is wholly outside the shelter of the First Amendment. Congress may make criminal any type of dealing with the enemy which in its judgment may have the potentiality of harm to our national interest.”[9] Furthermore, the narrower application of the material support statute would focus law enforcement resources in pursuing individual who pose an actual threat.

The Court is waiting on arguments from the government before deciding to grant certiorari. Even if the Court refuses to grant certiorari, the issues surrounding this case pose a fundamental question on what our nation sees as treason. At a time when America faces new and unpredictable threats, the Court needs clear precedent in guiding law enforcement about the rights of citizens in this new environment.

[1] 18 U.S.C. § 2339B (2012).

[2] Id.

[3] United  States v. Mehanna, 735 F.3d 32 (1st Cir. 2013).

[4] 560 U.S. 1 (2010).

[5] Id. at 2709.

[6] Id. at 2709-10.

[7] Id. at 2709.

[8] Id. at 2722.

[9] Chandler v. United States, 171 F.2d 921, 939 (1st Cir. 1948).

Upcoming Symposium

The Legacy of 1964: Race and Gender Inequity Fifty Years Later Symposium

The Alabama Civil Rights & Civil Liberties Law Review will host a one day symposium, “The Legacy of 1964: Race and Gender Inequity Fifty Years Later”, April 4, 2014 at the Law School.

The symposium is a commemoration of the 50th anniversary of the enactment of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.  The passage of the Act marked the beginning of a new era of American public life. At the time it was enacted, the Civil Rights Act of 1964 was perceived by many to be the codified culmination of decades of sustained effort to provide equal opportunity for women and racial minorities.  To its supporters, the Act embodied a promise to end systemic, institutional, and private barriers to women and racial minorities’ full and fair inclusion in the public and economic life of the nation.

The symposium will offer an examination of that promise from the vantage point of 2014. Calling together preeminent scholars in the study of race and sex equality, the symposium will explore the legacy of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, utilizing a diverse set of perspectives and methodologies.

Symposium Participants:

Alfred L. Brophy, Judge John J. Parker Distinguished Professor of Law, University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill
Dorothy A. Brown, Vice Provost and Professor of Law, Emory University
Anthony E. Cook, Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center
Trina Jones, Professor of Law, Duke University School of Law
Gregory Parks, Assistant Professor of Law, Wake Forest School of Law
Jasmine Gonzales Rose, Assistant Professor of Law, University of Pittsburgh School of Law

Expansion of Religious Freedoms or Justification for Discrimination?

Expansion of Religious Freedoms or Justification for Discrimination?

Katherine Reeves

For the past few weeks, the United States’ media has yet again focused on laws presented by the Arizona Legislature.  Senate Bill 1062[1] has created uproar across the nation, and many cite to this media coverage as the reasoning behind Governor Jan Brewer’s veto of the bill.[2]  Supporters say the bill is solely about religious liberty while those in opposition contend the bill is directly “anti-gay” legislation although there is no mention of sexuality in the text.[3]

As the wave of “gay rights” sweeps our nation, the question of the extent of religious freedom has again come to the forefront as a hot political issue in our society. It is important that we take time to look back at the history of both religious freedom and same-sex couples’ rights in American laws.  Additionally, other areas of civil liberty have offered to limit the scope of religious freedom. The Supreme Court has acted as a referee in many of these cases and offers some guidance as to the stance of the Federal Government on the balance between civil and religious liberty.

The proponents of Senate bill focus on the importance of legal protection for religious beliefs in the United States. The concept of religious freedom dates back to the colonial times of the future United States and was so credited as one of the reasons for the break from the English government.[4]  Although the country was primarily Christian, the framers of the United States Constitution formed the “free exercise” clause under the First Amendment broadly to include all religion.[5]  The Supreme Court has interpreted the free exercise clause on many occasions beginning with deeming it a strict scrutiny Constitutional issue. In Sherbert v. Verner.[6] In 1990, however, the Court denied religious exemptions from “neutral laws of general applicability.”[7] Many states reacted to this decision by enacting laws offering expanded protections for freedom of religion.[8]  Additionally, Congress took action by passing the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993[9] but this legislation was short lived as the Supreme Court ruled it unconstitutional under the Fourteenth Amendment.[10] The limited protection offered by the Federal Government makes state protections more important.[11]

Turning to the opposition’s view of the bill, we must look to the history of laws relating to homosexuals.  The “gay rights movement”[12] has gained significant attention on the topic of marriage equality, but how did we get to this point? Although there have never been explicit laws against being gay, related laws caused legal recourse for being homosexual.[13] Stoumen v. Reilly, in 1951 spurred the beginning of restricting state discrimination of homosexuals where the Court said that a liquor license could not be withheld simply because the business served homosexuals.[14] Fast forward nearly half of a century (during which our system evolved dramatically), the Supreme Court ruled a Colorado constitutional amendment banning any anti-discrimination laws protecting homosexuals as unconstitutional.[15] That decision paved the way for subsequent Supreme Court cases which invalidated many sodomy laws and struck down Section 3 of the Defense of Marriage Act.[16]

The gay rights at odds with religious freedoms covered in the recent Arizona bill are more closely related to the topic of discrimination in private business.  Religious freedom in business ownership and operation has recently been in the spotlight due to contraceptive coverage in mandated health coverage for full time employees. Currently pending before the Supreme Court, is a case challenging this portion of health coverage based on the religious beliefs and practices of the Hobby Lobby Corporation.[17] The question presented under this case is whether the federal government’s mandate of contraceptive coverage violated the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 (RFRA)[18] that states that the government “shall not substantially burden a person’s exercise of religion.”[19] There is a distinct separation between the recent Arizona bill and this case: the Hobby Lobby case is regarding federal legislation effecting religious freedom. This case may offer guidance, however, in evaluating the fallen bill because the supporters of the vetoed Arizona bill claim that the broad wording of the bill was aimed at preventing issues of the state forcing businesses to participate in practices that may infringe on their religious beliefs.

In 1999 Arizona became one of the many states to take the protection of religious liberties into their own hands and enacted the Free Exercise of Religion Act (FERA).[20] Senate Bill 1062 is cited as an extension of the FERA by expanding the original definitions of “exercise of religion,” “person,” and “state action.”[21] The bill intended to expand the protections for religious individuals from state action that may burden religious beliefs. Additionally, the bill provided for injunctive and declarative relief in the incident of “claim or defense in a judicial proceeding” on the basis of burden on their religious beliefs.[22] In short, this provision allows individuals to file suit when they believe any state or local laws are violating religious rights, including any anti-discrimination laws.[23]

Although Arizona does not currently have a statewide law banning discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation, several local governments have passed such laws.[24] It is due to these anti-discrimination laws, that the Arizona legislature presented Senate Bill 1062. Their actions were directly in anticipation of legal issues due to the difficult relationship “between the freedom of religion and the right not to be discriminated against on the grounds of sexual orientation.”[25] Governor Brewer indicated her opinion of the bill, in her statement after her announced veto, by saying that the bill had “the potential to create more problems than it purports to solve.”[26] Brewer was referring to the lack of conflict with the anti-discrimination laws in Arizona; however such conflict has recently occurred in other states. In August 2013, the Supreme Court of New Mexico affirmed that a photography company violated anti-discrimination laws by refusing to photograph a customer’s same-sex wedding.[27] Although the issue has not arisen in Arizona, it is important to recognize the intent of the legislature to avoid such conflict of religion and discrimination laws in the courts.

This is not an issue that the United States is unfamiliar with, as feminism presented many of the same issues.[28] It is evident that the issue of women’s rights was more socially challenged than religiously challenged; therefore, anti-discrimination laws on the basis of gender did not face freedom of religion adversity this severely. Additionally, the United States legal system has faced many issues on the topic of anti-discrimination laws on the basis of race. Although it is commonly known that discrimination based on race and gender is still common, hindsight shows us the necessity of such laws.

The issue before us is about the expansion of religious freedom’s effect on discrimination against homosexuals. The extent of power of individuals and businesses to make decisions based on their religion is not only a question in Arizona, but throughout our country.  So what do we value more as Americas: the freedom of religion or the freedom to not be discriminated against? Although there is no easy answer, Senate Bill 1062’s veto indicates the latter.

[1] SB. 1062, 51st Leg., 2nd Reg. Sess. (Az. 2014).

[2] See, Warren Richey, Was vetoed Arizona bill misrepresented? What constitutional scholars say., The Christian Science Moniter, Feb. 27, 2014,; Timothy Egan, Arizona did us all a favor, New York Times, March 1, 2014,; See also, Tammy Bruce, Why the veto of Arizona’s religious freedom bill is alarming,, Feb. 28, 2014,

[3] See, Richey, supra note 2.

[4] See generally, Geoffrey R. Stone, The World of the Framers: A Christian Nation?, 56 UCLA L. Rev. 1, 3 (2008)

[5] U.S. Const. amend I (“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise.”)

[6] 374 U.S. 398 (1963).

[7] Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990).

[8] David H.E. Becker, Free Exercise of Religion Under the New York Constitution, 84 Cornell L. Rev. 1088, 1093 (1999)

[9] Pub. L. No. 103-141, 107 Stat. 1488 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb to bb-4 (1994)), declared unconstitutional by City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997).

[10] Becker, supra note 8, Becker.

[11] Id.

[12] See generally, Patricia A. Cain, Litigating for Lesbian and Gay Rights: A Legal History, 79 Va. L. Rev. 1551, 1553 (1993)

[13] Id at 1564-1565

[14] 234 P.2d 969 (Cal. 1951).

[15] Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996).

[16] Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2008); U.S. v. Windsor, No. 12-307 (U.S. June 26,2013).

[17] Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, 723 F.3d 1114 (10th Cir. 2013) cert. granted, 134 S. Ct. 678 (2013) (No. 13-356, 2013 Term; renumbered No. 13-354, 2013 term)

[18] Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, PL 103–141, November 16, 1993, 107 Stat 1488

[19] Id.

[20] Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 41-1493.01 (West)

[21] SB. 1062, 51st Leg., 2nd Reg. Sess. (Az. 2014).

[22] Id.

[23] Richey, supra note 2.

[24] Id.

[25] Megan Pearson, Religious Claims vs. Non-Discrimination Rights: Another Plea for Difficulty, 15 Rutgers J. L. & Religion 47 (2013)

[26] Richey, supra note 2.

[27] Elane Photography, LLC v. Willock, 309 P.3d 53 (N.M. 2013)

[28] See generally, Pearson, supra note 25.

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